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International Transportation Law
JIM BERGERON, LORRAINE
MARK
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B.

HALLOWAY, GERALD

F.

MURPHY, CAROLYN ELBERT,

AND STEVEN SNELL*

I. Developments in Aviation Law
A.

THE CAPE TOWN TREATY COMES INTO FORCE

The Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on
Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment adopted on November 16, 2001, at a diplomatic
conference held in Cape Town, South Africa (Cape Town), will enter into force on March
1, 2006, following Malaysia's deposit of the eighth necessary instrument of ratification/
accession on November 2, 2006.' The Cape Town Convention creates a new international
registry for security interests in certain aircraft and engines, as well as a new system for
filing and perfecting those interests.
Generally speaking, Cape Town adopts the U.S. asset-based financing and assignment of
payment rights concepts reflected in the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code as the international standard in this area and extends such concepts into areas of the world with inadequate bodies of commercial law that would otherwise present prohibitive risk and credit
challenges. 2 Cape Town will be applicable to all aircraft that are type-certificated to transport at least eight persons (including crew), all helicopters certificated to transport at least

*Section I was written by Lorraine B. Halloway and Gerald F. Murphy of Crowell & Moring LLP in
Washington, D.C., and Carolyn Elbert of Blank & Rome LLP in Washington, D.C. Sections I1and I were
written by MarkJ. Andrews of Strasburger & Price LLP, Washington, D.C. Section IV was written by Steven
Snell. The chapter was compiled and edited by Professor Jim Bergeron, Political Advisor, Naval Striking and
Support Forces, NATO.
1. See UNIDROIT News and Events, Cape Town Convention and Aircraft Protocol-Entry into Force,
http://www.unidroit.org/english/news/main.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2006). The United States became the
fifth country to fully adopt Cape Town in August of 2004 and has already taken steps to initiate the required
changes to the applicable Federal Aviation Administration regulations. The other six countries to have adopted
Cape Town are: Ethiopia, Ireland, Oman, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Panama, which are joined by twenty-eight
other signatories including Canada, Italy, and Turkey. See International Civil Aviation Organization, Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, Nov. 16, 2004, available at http://www.unidroit.org/
english/implement/i-200 1-aircraftprotocol.pdf.
2. See Memorandum, Hearing on the Cape Town Treaty and Markup Before the H. Subcomm. on Aviation, 108th
Cong. (Apr. 29, 2004), available at http://www.house.gov/transportation/aviation/04-29-04/04-29-04memo.
html.
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five persons (including crew) and aircraft engines having at least 550 horsepower or equivalent,3 if at the time of the underlying transaction the aircraft is registered in a Contracting
State or if the debtor is situated in a Contracting State. 4 Cape Town will cover all international interests in aircraft objects.' The International Registry database in which all Cape
Town filings will be searchable is to be established in Ireland.6 Nothing in the Convention
or the related regulations that will become effective upon Cape Town's coming into force
will affect previously filed registrations, recordations or the existing rights arising therefrom. While the implementation of Cape Town has been supported by the relevant government agencies and the aerospace manufacturing sector, aircraft operators remain cautious about the economic burdens that may be associated with compliance.
B.

UNITED STATES AND

EU

REFUSE TO SETTLE

WTO

DISPUTE OVER AIRCRAFT SuBSIDIES

Despite having reached a settlement agreement to end aircraft subsidies on January 11,
2005, the United States and the European Commission remain embroiled in a fight over
this issue that has persisted for over two decades.7 The most recent stage of this controversy
began when both sides filed competing complaints with the World Trade Organization on
October 6, 2004, after failing to reach an agreement to replace the 1992 U.S.-European
Union Agreement on Large Civil Aircraft (the 1992 Agreement). Each side alleges that the
other continues to provide illegal aircraft subsidies to their rival aircraft manufacturersBoeing in the United States and Airbus in Europe. While still under the guise of negotiating
a settlement to end the subsidies, the European Commission appeared to shift its focus in
March 2005 to reducing subsidies rather than eliminating them' because it was revealed
that at least four European governments had agreed, at least in principle, to provide launch
aid subsidies to Airbus.9 The European Commission, on the other hand, contends that the
U.S. government and the governments of various states where Boeing's production facilities
and headquarters are located continue to transfer economic incentives to the aircraft manufacturer through various financial incentives and other advantages, which include, but are
not limited to: tax breaks, bond financing, lease arrangements, and research funding. 0 On
October 17, 2005, the World Trade Organization established the three-member panels that

3. See Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to
Aircraft Equipment, art. I, Nov. 16, 2001, availableat www.unidroit.org/English/conventions/mobile-equipment/
aircraftprotocol.pdf.
4. See id., art. IV.
5. See id.
6. See UNIDRIOT, ANNuAL REPORT 2004, Report 2004-C.D. (84), 9 (2005), available at http://www.
unidroit.org/english/publicaions/proceedings/2005/cd/cd84-02-e.pdf.
7. See Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, United States Takes Next Step in
Airbus WTO Litigation (May 30, 2005), available at http://ustr.gov/Document-Library/Press-Releases/2005/
May/UnitedStatesTakes-NextStep-in-Airbus-WTO-Litigation.html.
8. Id.
9. See Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, European Communities and Certain
Member States-MeasuresAffecting Trade in Large CivilAircraft, WT/DS316/2 (June 3, 2005), availableat http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_-e/dispu-_ e/cases-e/ds316-e.htm.
10. See Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities, UnitedStates-Measures
Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS317/2 (June 3, 2005), availableat http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_.e/dispu-e/cases_ e/ds317_e.htm.
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will rule on each of the competing complaints." Although the parties remain free to settle
the disputes, the cases could take years to resolve if they progress into full-blown litigation.
C. DOT PROPOSES

A NEW FOREIGN CONTROL STANDARD FOR

U.S.

AIRLINES

On November 2, 2005, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) announced a
rulemaking proposal that would change the way the Department interprets actual control
of an air carrier for purposes of determining U.S. citizenship under the definition in section
40102(a)(15) of tide 49 of the U.S. Code. 2 The new foreign control rule would allow nonU.S. investors from countries with Open Skies aviation agreements to control the economic
activities (such as day-to-day operations, market entry strategy, and aircraft purchases) of
U.S. air carriers, as long as the foreigner's homeland provides reciprocal rights to Americans.
Section 40102(a)(15), as amended byVision 100, 1 requires that U.S. air carriers are under
the actual control of U.S. citizens and also that the carrier are incorporated in the United
States, that the carrier's president and two-thirds of the board of directors are U.S. citizens,
and that U.S. citizens own no less than 75 percent of its voting stock. The actual control
requirement was part of CAB and DOT administrative precedent 4 and was codified in
2003 following issuance of a letter from DOT's Office of Inspector General related to the
hotly contested DHL Citizenship case.'"
The proposed rule would reduce substantially "the significance ...of foreign influence

over many purely economic decisions" for qualified non U.S.-citizens. 6 For example, an
air carrier would be permitted to have qualified foreigners in charge of day-to-day operations, to head a committee on market entry strategy, and to have influence over aircraft
purchases. Control by U.S. citizens would continue to be required in areas where significant
government regulation and oversight remains. Foreign citizens from countries without
Open Skies agreements would remain subject to the more strict traditional control analysis.
The public comment period runs until January 6, 2006. On November 18, 2005, over
sixty congressmen wrote to U.S. Secretary of Transportation Norman Y Mineta opposing
the DOT's loosening of the actual control requirement, voicing concern that the Department is making these changes through policy rather than through statutory revisions. Other
critics of the proposal include labor unions and several airlines.

11. See Constitution Of The Panel Established At The Request Of The European Communities, United
States-MeasuresAffecting Trade In Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS317/4 (Oct. 25, 2005), available at http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_-e/dispu-e/cases-e/ds317-e.huo; Constitution Of The Panel Established AtThe
Request Of The United States, European Union-MeasuresAffecting Trade In Large CivilAircraft,W/IDS/316/
4 (Oct. 25, 2005), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/cases-e/ds316-e.htm.
12. Actual Control of U.S. Air Carriers, 70 Fed. Reg. 67,389 (Nov. 7, 2005) (to be codified at 14 C.YR.
§§ 204, 399) [hereinafter Actual Control of U.S. Air Carriers].
13. See 117 Stat. 2490 (codified as 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2003)).
14. Under a series of administrative cases dating back to 1940, CAB and DOT determined "actual control"
by examining several factors related to control of an air carrier airline, including: equity ownership; supermajority or disproportionate voting rights of shareholders; negative control and veto power over major decisions; family and business relationships between owners and foreigners; significant contracts with foreigners;
credit and debt instruments; and buy-out clauses. Actual Control of U.S. Air Carriers, supra note 12, at 67,390
(citing Letter from Dept. of Transportation Inspector General (Mar. 4, 2003)).
15. In the Matter of DHL Airways, Inc., DOT Docket No. OST-2002-13089 (2002).
16. Actual Control of U.S. Air Carriers, supra note 12, n.9.
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D.

OPEN SKIES MAKES PROGRESS IN 2005

In November 2005, the United States reached an Open Skies aviation agreement with
Canada and a tentative Open Skies deal with European negotiators that would liberalize
the trans-Atlantic aviation market. The U.S.-Canada Accord, which becomes effective in
September 2006, will make Canada the seventy-third Open Skies partner of the United
States. The new U.S.-Canada agreement amends a 1995 agreement that eliminated most
restrictions on air service between the two countries but provided virtually no rights for
airlines to operate within the other country and severely restricted express cargo services
between the two countries. These restrictions will be removed when Open Skies takes effect
next year.

Also, in late 2005, U.S. and European negotiators resumed long-stalled talks and reached
a tentative agreement to allow their airlines to fly unrestricted routes across the Adantic.
The tentative agreement must be approved by the European Union's (EU's) Transport
Council of Ministers, which represents all twenty-five member states of the EU. A comprehensive Open Skies agreement will depend on the United States' agreeing to lift ownership caps that limit foreign investment in U.S. airlines. 7 Although U.S. negotiators said
DOT's proposed foreign control rule discussed above was not linked to the U.S.-EU negotiations, the proposal was announced on the eve of those talks and DOT's Under Secretary for Policy briefed the EU delegation on the proposal.
E.

COURT UPHOLDS

DOT

AUTHORITY TO REGULATE INDEPENDENT

CRSs

On November 22, 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
ruled that DOT has jurisdiction under the federal aviation statutes to enforce its prohibi8
tions on unfair and deceptive practices against computer reservation systems (CRSs). The
case arose when Sabre, Inc., a CRS that currently is not owned by an air carrier or foreign
air carrier, challenged DOT's assertion in a final rule sunsetting the agency's CRS rules
that all CRSs remain subject to the DOT authority under section 411 of the Federal Avi9
ation Act, as amended,' because such CRSs are deemed statutory "ticket agent[s]." The
D.C. Circuit held that Sabre had standing to bring its petition and that the pre-enforcement
case was ripe to hear, even though no DOT rules currently constrain Sabre's business
activity and no relevant enforcement actions against any independent CRS are pending.
Nevertheless, the court rejected Sabre's challenge to DOT's interpretation of its authority
20
under section 411 on the merits.
F. STATUS OF DVT LITIGATION

Passengers have recently filed numerous lawsuits against airlines and aircraft manufacturers as a result of incidents of Deep Vein Thrombosis (DVT) on extended flights. DVT
occurs when blood clots form, usually in the lower extremities, and eventually cause a stroke

17.
at 1.
18.
19.
20.

See Martial Tardy, EU Wants Clarficationon U.S. Ownership Rule Changes,Aviation Daily, Dec. 6, 2005,
Sabre, Inc. v. Dept. of Transp., 429 E3d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
49 U.S.C. § 41712(a) (2006).
Sabre, Inc., 429 F3d at 1117-1125.
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or a pulmonary embolism. The claims most closely being watched have been filed in courts
in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia.'
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention22 governing injuries that occur on international
flights, provides that a carrier is liable for damages caused to a person by an accident on
board the aircraft. The seminal case interpreting article 17 is Air Francev. Saks.23 In Saks,
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that for purposes of article 17, an "accident" is "an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger."2 4 The Court further
clarified that an injury that "indisputably results from the passenger's own internal reaction
to the usual, normal, and expected operation of the aircraft" is not an accident."
The Supreme Court expanded the Saks definition of accident in Olympic Airways v. Hu6
sain, holding that an accident under article 17 could also include an airline's failure to act.1
While this expansion of the concept could potentially impact DVT litigation, it has yet to
do so. Since the Husain decision, both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have relied on the Saks
definition of accident in ruling that development of DVT on a flight does not constitute
an accident under article 17.27
Internationally, the Saks decision has also been widely relied upon in DVT claims. The
High Court of Australia ruled in Povey v. QantasAirways"8 that an air carrier's failure to
warn about the risk of DVT, even if proved, does not constitute an accident under article
17. This was a test case and the outcome was determinative for approximately 500 other
DVT cases brought against airlines in Australia. Group litigation is still underway in the
United Kingdom. The High Court of Australia found that the occurrence of DVT on an
airline did not constitute an accident under the Warsaw convention, and an appeal from
this decision was dismissed by the Court of Appeals.29 British Airways funded an appeal to
the House of Lords which was heard October 19-20, 2005, and a decision is expected
shortly.
In the United States, many of the DVT claims were consolidated into a multidistrict
litigation (MDL) in June 2004. The MDL includes claims against many air carriers, as well
as Boeing, an aircraft manufacturer. Many of the claims against Boeing have been dismissed.
All MDL claims against airlines involving travel only within the United States were dismissed. The court ruled that the extensive federal regulatory framework regarding the
aviation industry preempted claims based solely on state law. Defendants have brought
motions to dismiss remaining passenger claims premised on article 17. The MDL court
has not yet ruled on this motion.

21. While claims have also been filed in Canada, France, and Germany, the majority of claims are brought
in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Cases heard in Canada, France, and Germany have
had the same outcome as those in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia.
22. Convention and Additional Protocol between the United States of America and Other Powers Relating
to International Air Transportation (Warsaw Convention), 49 Stat. 3000, Oct. 12, 1929, (reprintedin 49 U.S.C.

§ 40105 (2005)).
23. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
24. Id. at 405.
25. Id. at 406.
26. Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 645 (2004).
27. See Blansett v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 379 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S 1022 (2004);
Rodriguez v. Ansett Australia, Ltd., 383 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2004).
28. Povey v. Qantas Airways Ltd., (2005) 216 A.L.R. 427 (Austl.).
29. Id.
SUMMER 2006
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HI. Trade Controls in International Forwarding
In 2005, members of the international forwarding and logistics community learned that

they must pay greater attention to the ever-thickening web of U.S. regulations on imports,
exports and other international business transactions. Although forwarders and other transportation service providers historically had interfaced with import and export regulators on
matters such as customs bonds and the filing of export declarations, they tended to believe
that compliance with more substantive export controls and trade sanctions was primarily
or exclusively the responsibility of their customers. This attitude was challenged on April
28, 2005, by a senior export official at the U.S. Department of Commerce (DoC):
This year in the enforcement area, there will be an increased focus on shipping companies and
freight forwarders. . .. [They] are the last best chance of preventing illegal exports and are
critical in protecting our national security. Traditionally the onus has been on the exporter
alone to follow regulations and obtain licenses.... However, recent cases have made clear that
30
freight forwarders have a responsibility to know the customer and to pay attention to red flags.

The same points were made in individualized letters sent to numerous forwarders by the
Director of DoC's Office of Export Enforcement during the autumn of 2005.
The specific reasons forwarders, carriers and other providers of logistics services need to
pay closer attention to substantive U.S. foreign trade regulations include the following:
(1) Numerous U.S. federal agencies regulate various types of imports, exports, transactions with sanctioned countries and groups, and such related matters as participation
by U.S. companies in international boycotts.
(2) These regulations encompass more than physical imports and exports. There are
significant restrictions on disclosure of technology to foreign nationals, and even on
domestic transactions with persons covered by U.S. embargo regulations.
(3) The rules also reach more than importers, exporters and other principal actors in

international transactions. Anyone who aids, abets, or facilitates a prohibited transaction can be penalized-and that includes carriers and forwarders, without regard
to the technical regulatory definitions used in the transportation industry.
Everyone covered by U.S. trade regulations is conclusively presumed to be familiar with
lists of "red flags" and "prohibited parties" developed by the various involved agencies. The
lists are constantly expanding, and the definition of "knowing participation" in violations
is broad. Enforcement efforts and exposures have escalated since the events of September
11, 2001, and ever more forwarders (broadly defined) are paying significant financial penalties. These exposures will grow as increasing numbers of U.S. rail and motor carriers set
up logistics and forwarding units to follow customers into the global marketplace, and as
foreign-based providers expand into the U.S. market.3

30. Peter Lichtenbaum, Acting Under Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Speech at the 8th National
Forum on Export Controls (Apr. 28, 2005), available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/news/2005/USNationalForum.
hon.
31. Of course, export controls and related matters are covered in depth by other committees within the
Section of International Law and Practice. This high-level overview is intended to provide an alert on these
issues to the non-specialist who may encounter them when handling international transportation matters for
service providers or their customers.
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Export Administration Regulations (EAR) are issued by.the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) within DoC. 2 The EAR impose intricate regulations and limitations on the
export of goods or technology that are capable of "dual use" for military and civilian purposes. The EAR also reach "deemed exports" of technology through disclosure to foreign
nationals, even on U.S. soil."
Under 15 C.F.R. section 764.2(e):
[n]o person may ... remove, ... store, ... dispose of,transfer, transport, ...forward, or otherwise
service, in whole or in part, any item exported or to be exported from the United States, or
that is otherwise subject to the EAR, with knowledge that a violation of... the3 EAR...
has
4
occurred, is about to occur, or is intended to occur in connection with the item.
The EAR definition of "knowledge" extends far beyond actual knowledge. It also includes
"awareness of a high probability" of a violation, as well as "conscious disregard of facts
known" or "willful avoidance of facts.""
Almost certainly, the "willful avoidance" prong of the "knowledge" definition can be used
against forwarders and carriers who ignore "know your customer" guidance and the list of
transactional "red flags" published by BIS. 36 The BIS publication contains a Freight Forwarder Guidance page, which states that a "forwarding or other agent," just like the exporter
itself, "should decide whether there are red flags, inquire about them, and ensure that suspicious circumstances are not ignored."" BIS uses the term forwarder in a broad, nontechnical sense. The EAR do not specifically define that term, although they do define a
"forwarding agent" broadly enough to cover "air couriers" and "carriers" who "facilitate"
exports.3s A "forwarding agent" must keep records for five years concerning a universe of
export transactions, which is almost as broad as the scope of the EAR themselves." Moreover, regulations prohibit a "false or misleading representation" by any person "[in connection with the preparation... of any export control document"- and an export control
document is defined as including, among other things, a "bill of lading issued by any
4
carrier." I
BIS is increasingly inclined to wield these regulatory weapons against forwarders of all
types. Numerous examples of EAR violations by carriers and forwarders are included in
"Don'tLet This Happen to You!," a collection of recent civil penalty cases posted by BIS at
its previously-cited website on enforcement.4 Carriers are particularly vulnerable to this
32. See Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.ER. §§ 730-58, 762-74 (2006).
33. See id. § 734.2(b)(2)(ii) (defining "export" to include disclosure of technology or source code to most
foreign nationals, even within the United States).
34. Id. § 764.2(e).

35. See id. § 772.1.
36. Id. pt. 732, supp. 3; see generally U.S. Dep't of Commerce, The Export Enforcement Program, http://
www.bis.doc.gov/enforcement (last visited Mar. 15, 2006).
37. Dep't of Commerce, Freight Forwarder Guidance, http://www.bis.doc.gov/enforcement/Freight
ForwarderGuidance.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2006) (emphasis added).
38. 15 C.ER. § 772.1.
39. Id. § 762.1(b).
40. Id. § 764.2(g)(1)(ii).
41. Id. § 772.1.
42. Dep't of Commerce, Don't Let This Happen to You!!!, Feb. 2003, http://www.bis.doc.gov/enforcement/
Dontletthishappen2u.pdf; see also STRASBURGER AND PRICE, BULLS EYE: FREIGHT FORWARDERS TARGETED BY
EXPORT ENFORCEMENT IN 2005 (Jan. 2005), available at http://www.strasburger.com/calendar/news/FTC/0501.asp
(on file with author).
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enforcement blitz, given the government's3 power to detain and even seize vessels and other
4
conveyances involved in EAR violations.
Export controls are only part of the web of federal foreign trade regulations. BIS also
enforces rules that generally ban support of, or cooperation with, the Arab boycott against
Israel. 44 And by no means is BIS the only federal trade enforcer. Its military counterpart is
the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, a State Department agency that enforces the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations. 41 Within the Treasury Department, the Office
of Foreign Asset Controls (OFAC) regulates international and even domestic transactions
involving a large and fluid list of Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs). This list contains
thousands of individuals and businesses (including some in the United States) that OFAC
identifies with countries and groups subject to U.S. economic sanctions.- Broadly speaking,
47
U.S. persons may not transactbusiness of any sort with SDNs. According to monthly postings

of enforcement information available at the OFAC website, carriers and forwarders accounted for almost 20 percent of all companies subjected to civil penalties by OFAC during
the first ten months of 1995. Transportation was the second largest industry group penalized
by OFAC during that period, trailing only financial institutions. The new complexities of
import/export regulation must now be added to the knowledge base of carriers and forwarders as supply chains increasingly go global.
M. Recent Developments in Transport Security Regulation
A. C-TPAT

AND

FAST

The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) within the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) has revised the guidelines for importers in its program known
as the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT).4s C-TPAT is a voluntary
program open to importers, cross-border rail and highway carriers, customs brokers, ocean
freight consolidators and air freight forwarders. Its purpose is to assist manufacturers, importers, and transporters in improving the security of their supply chains and thus improving the security of U.S. borders and the global marketplace.
The C-TPAT qualification process involves several steps.49 The first is the completion
and submission of a Supply Chain Security Profile (the Profile) that establishes the applicant's commitment to ensuring adherence to C-TPAT security criteria. This commitment
involves not only surveying the applicant's business partners, including manufacturers, suppliers, vendors and transportation service providers, but also obtaining written certification
that the business partners are compliant with C-TPAT criteria.

43. See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. §§ 758.7(d)(4)-(d)(9).
44. Id. § 760.
45. See generally Int'l Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.FR. §§ 120-130 (2006).
46. The list is availableat http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn.
47. See generally Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 500 et seq. (2006).
48. See generally U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Partnership to Secure the Supply Chain: CustomsTrade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), availableat http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/import/commercial
enforcement/ctpat/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2006).
49. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, C-TPAT Partner Application for Importers-Instructions, http://
www.cbp.gov/xp/cgv/imprt/ciMmercia-enfrcement/ctpat06n)ine.tpat-app-process/importers/appication-

importerxm Olast visited Mar. 15, 2006).
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The list of criteria is expansive. 0 It includes qualification of the partner in C-TPAT (or,
in the case of a foreign partner, a similar government program in its country of domicile);
facility security (including entryways, lighting, parking, fencing, and general structural
soundness); transportation security (including locks and seals, access, storage, handling, and
the physical condition of cargo containers); personnel security (including entry controls,
identification cards, background checks, and termination procedures (e.g. changing passwords and locks); and documentation and information technology security.
When the profile is completed, the applicant must submit the application on-line,"' including the uploaded profile. Selected applications and profiles will be validated by CBP
through a company briefing, review of the profile, and one or more on-site visits at both
the company and its foreign supply chain partners to evaluate their willingness and actual
compliance with the C-TPAT criteria. If the applicant passes the validation, it then enters
into an agreement with CBP that contains supply-chain security commitments. Under its
current format, the formulation and administration of CBP rules and regulations are free
from the strictures of the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act."2 Participation is voluntary,
and the conditions of participating, though adopted in consultation with industry, are unilaterally adopted, imposed and enforced by CBP.
The impact of C-TPAT qualification is both illusory and real. In terms of public relations,
of course, there may be a positive public perception that a company complying with these
security requirements is supporting national efforts at border protection. More concrete
impacts result from the fact that a company can only qualify for C-TPAT if its entire supply
chain also qualifies. When a large manufacturer applies, it in effect forces all components
of its supply chain likewise to "volunteer" to participate in C-TPAT if they want to continue
to be able to do business with that manufacturer. Consequently, a program that began with
just seven "volunteers" has grown in a few years to encompass close to 10,000 participants.
A company that has qualified with C-TPAT will experience fewer audits, inspections and
other border delays at the hands of CBP. This is unlikely to be of great benefit in the case
of ocean imports, however, since the stacking of containers on an oceangoing vessel (and
thus the time needed to unload them) generally has little to do with the C-TPAT or nonC-TPAT status of the cargo owner. For trucking companies and their customers along the
U.S./Canada and U.S./Mexico land borders, however, the benefits are somewhat more
concrete. Qualification in C-TPAT and its sister program, called Free and Secure Trade
(FAST)," enables a truck to utilize special lanes to cross these borders and by-pass most
54
customs inspections.

50. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, C-TPAT Importer Security Criteria, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/
cgov/import/commercialenforcementctpat/criteria-importers/ctpat-importer-criteria.xml (lastvisited Mar. 15,
2006).
51. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, C-TPAT Security Criteria for Importers Implementation Plan,
http://www.cbp.gov/inkhandler/cgov/import/commercial-enforcement/ctpat/security-criteria/criteriaimporters/implementation-plan.ctt/criteriaImplementation2.doc(last visited Mar. 15, 2006).
52. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 etseq. (2006).
53. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Free and Secure Trade Program (FAST), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/
cgov/import/commercial-enforcement/ctpat/fast/(last visited Mar. 15, 2006).
54. In Canada, FAST builds on the principles of pre-approval and self-assessment embodied in the Customs
Self-Assessment Program (CSA), as well as on increased security measures under the Partners in Protection
program (PIP). See generally Canada Border Services Agency, The Customs Self Assessment Program, http://
www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/import/csa/menu-e.htnl (last visited Mar. 15, 2006).
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An importer or trucking company seeking to participate in the FAST program must first
qualify for C-TPAT. A distinct difference between the two programs is that while C-TPAT
applies only to companies, FAST also applies to individuals, specifically truck drivers. To
qualify for the benefits of this program, the importer, carrier, and driver must all be FAST
participants. Having cleared that hurdle, FAST participants benefit not only from special
lanes at border crossings, but also from a reduced time frame for advance submission of
electronic pre-notifications to CBP. The time frame for a FAST qualified shipment is only
thirty minutes, as compared to the one-hour requirement for non-FAST qualified shipments.,, FAST qualification requires security background checks for both carriers and their
drivers. The driver application involves a pre-arranged personal interview at a CBP facility
located on or near the border. These requirements have caused long delays in the appli56
cation process.
B. HAZARDOUS

MATERIAL DRIVER BACKGROUND CHECKS

The USA PATRIOT Act 7 requires all states to perform criminal and immigration background checks on persons applying for a new or renewed hazardous materials endorsement
to a commercial driver's license. While this requirement finally became effective in May
2005,5s its application is limited by its very nature to U.S. drivers (since U.S. states generally
do not license non-resident drivers). In August 2005, as part of a massive transportation re-

authorization bill known as the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation
Equity Act, a Legacy for Users (SAFETEALU),19 the U.S. Congress adopted a requirement that foreign-based truck drivers must obtain comparable background checks before
being allowed to transport hazardous materials in the United States.6° The Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) within DHS was given six months to implement the background check requirement, with authority to delay implementation for an additional six

months. Congress also directed TSA to determine if the background check procedures
under the FAST program, discussed above, would fulfill the Congressional mandate. As of
early December 2005, TSA had taken no public action to implement this provision.
IV.Maritime Law Developments
A.

THE

UNCITRAL

DRAFT CONVENTION ON CARRIAGE OF GOODS

In November 2005 the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) Working Group on Transport Law resumed its deliberations on the Draft
Carriage of Goods Convention. Its aim is to provide a uniform international regime goveming cargo-carriage by sea that would replace the Hague Rules, the Hague-Visby Rules,
the Hamburg Rules, and an assortment of domestic statutes, which currently apply to ocean-

55. See Customs Relations with Canada and Mexico, 19 C.FR. § 123 (2006).
56. See Free and Secure Trade Program, supra note 53.
57. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 101 (2001)).
58. See Security Threat Assessment for Individuals Applying for a Hazardous Materials Endorsement for a
Commercial Driver's License, 69 Fed. Reg. 68,720 (Nov. 24, 2004) (to be codified at 49 C.ER. § 1572).
59. Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users or "SAFETEALU," Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144 (codified at 23 U.S.C. §101 (2005)).

60. See id. § 7105(h).
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transport of goods. While the draft seeks to reconcile differences in the present conventions
and domestic rules, it also goes beyond previous proposals, extending the geographic scope
of regulated carriage and offering uniform rules governing such matters as transport documents and electronic transactions.
In its present form, the UNCITRAL draft would govern contracts in the liner trade but
would exclude private carriage in the tramp trade. The UNCITRAL Working Group reasoned that contracts in the liner trade-where shippers have less bargaining power than
carriers-are less likely to be negotiated individually, while carriage under charterparty is
generally the product of bargaining between equals, and thus may be safely omitted from
the proposed convention. Most noteworthy in the draft's novel approach are the provisions
relating to multimodal carriage. Where the Hague Rules and the U.S. Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act (COGSA) apply only "tackle-to-tackle," the draft envisions a modified "doorto-door" approach for multimodal shipment covered by a thorough bill of lading. So long
as one portion of the journey is by sea, the UNCITRAL Convention's rules on liability for
damage to cargo would apply as between parties to the contract, irrespective of whether
the damage occurred at sea or on land. To reach agreement on the current draft, the
UNCITRAL Working Group was obliged to carve out an exception to appease several
European delegations, who maintained that the door-to-door approach would conflict with
their existing obligations under the European road and rail conventions. The draft provides
that, if it could be proven that damage to cargo occurred during transport on land, and an
international road or rail convention would apply in the absence of the UNCITRAL convention, then the applicable road or rail convention would continue to apply.
With regard to the liability rules, the draft convention would retain (albeit in somewhat
modified form) the list of exceptions to carriers' liability presently enumerated in COGSA,
though it would abolish COGSAs "error in navigation" defense. It departs from COGSA
also in its treatment of scenarios in which damage to cargo is only partially attributable to
the carrier's conduct. While current U.S. domestic law places liability for damage solely on
the carrier in such cases, the UNCITRAL draft provides a proportionate fault rule, under
which a carrier would be liable only for the portion of the loss attributable to those of its
own actions not within the convention's enumerated exceptions. Still to be discussed are
the monetary limits on carriers' liability and the proposed special limits on liability for
delay. Issues open for discussion for the UNCITRAL Working Group's December 2005
session in Vienna include shippers' obligations and the enforceability of forum selection
clauses in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's Decision in Sky Reefer.61The UNCITRAL
Working Group hopes to have a final draft complete and ready to submit to the United
Nations General Assembly by the end of 2007, at which time it will be open for signature.
B.

NEW INTERPRETATION OF THE DEFINITION OF "VESSEL" IN U.S. LAW

Among all issues in maritime law, none is so basic as the definition of "vessel." The U.S.
Supreme Court revisited the definition in 2005 in Stewart v. Dutra Construction Co.62 The
case arose out of an accident aboard a harbor-dredge in Boston Harbor, in which a marine
engineer was severely injured. At trial the plaintiff had sought relief under the Jones Act

61. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995).
62. Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481 (2005).
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(covering seamen) and, in the alternative, under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), which applies to land-based maritime employees. For either
statute to be applicable, the court would have to find that the dredge was a vessel. The trial
court declined to do so, granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment; the First
Circuit affirmed. Seizing the opportunity to settle the question of the definition of a vessel
in personal injury cases, the Supreme Court granted certiorari; Justice Clarence Thomas
delivered the opinion of the court.
Beginning with the premise that, for both the Jones Act and the LHWCA, the definition
of vessel is supplied by section 3 of title I of the U.S. Code, Justice Thomas quoted the
statutory language: "[t]he word 'vessel' includes every description of water-craft or other
63
artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.
While the statute may be controlling, unfortunately its language in not unambiguous, forcing a court to look to various facts as indicia of whether a particular watercraft is a "means
of transportation." 64 The harbor-dredge in question had limited means of self-propulsion,
as it was moved short distances by manipulating anchors and cables at regular intervals of
several hours. For longer journeys, assistance of a tugboat was required. Nevertheless, the
opinion notes, the dredge had "certain characteristics common to seagoing vessels, such as
a captain and crew, navigational lights, ballast tanks, and a crew dining area. '65 While
making a distinction between watercraft that are only temporarily stationary and those that
are moored permanently (thus disqualifying them as vessels), the bulk of the Court's opinion
addresses, and overrules, the two-pronged test previously applied in the district and circuit
courts-namely, whether the watercraft's primary purpose is navigation and commerce and
whether it was in transit at the time of the accident.
Returning to the facts of the case and citing older case-law, Justice Thomas concludes
that "then, as now, dredges served a waterborne transportation function, since in performing
their work they carried machinery, equipment, and a crew over water. "66 Thus, despite being
stationary at the time of the accident and having only limited means of self-propulsion, the
harbor dredge was a vessel for purposes of both the Jones Act and the LHWCA. The case
was remanded, and, as expected, the First Circuit ultimately found the harbor-dredge to be
67
a vessel.
For most federal courts that addressed the issue in the ensuing months, the holding in
Stewart was clear. The Court had extended the definition of vessel. Thus in Uzdavines v.
the Second Circuit held that a "bucket-dredge" was a vessel, and in
Weeks Marine, Inc.,68
the Eighth Circuit held that a cleaning barge moored
Bunch v. Canton Marine Towing, Inc.,69

to the bed of the Missouri River with spud-poles also constituted a vessel, despite the fact
that it lacked self-propulsion and had been moved only once in 242 days. A federal district
court in Louisiana extended Stewart still further, holding that a newly-built oil rig still
undergoing sea-trials also qualified as a vessel under the Jones Act.70 In Gross v. Tonomo
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Id. at 489 (citing §§ 1 and 3 of the Revised Statutes of 1873).
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Id. at 484.
Id. at 492.
Stewart v. Dutra Construction Co., 418 E3d 32 (1st Cir. 2005).
Uzdavines v. Weeks Marine Inc., 418 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2005).
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Marine, Inc.,7" a federal magistrate found that a barge with a crane constituted a vessel,
quoting the Supreme Court's opinion in Stewart. The district court subsequently denied
the defendant barge-owner's motion for summary judgment."
Nevertheless, Stewart may prove over time to be more ambiguous than it appears on first
glance. In Arnold v. Luedtke Engineering," a federal district court in Michigan held that a
floating work-platform positioned adjacent to a sea-wall was not a vessel under the test
outlined in Stewart. More interesting is the opinion of the Fifth Circuit in Holmes v. Atlantic
Sounding Co., Inc.,74 in which the court held that a barge with a floating dormitory on its
deck was not a vessel, ironically citing Stewart in support of its position. The Fifth Circuit's
analysis reveals several features in Stewart that may make it difficult to follow in fufture cases.
First, the opinion in Stewart concentrates more on refuting the First Circuit's two-pronged
test than on clearly outlining a test of its own. By stating its ratio decidendi largely in the
negative, namely in refuting the requirements that a watercraft be primarilyused for navigation and transportation and that it be in motion at the time of the accident to qualify as
a vessel, the court has left little guidance for the circuits. In Holmes, the Fifth Circuit seized
upon two elements of the Supreme Court's analysis in Stewart. First, Stewart asserts that 1
U.S.C. § 3 merely codifies the general maritime law's definition of vessel. Second, Stewart
emphasizes physical features of the harbor-dredge that were often associated with seagoing
vessels. The floating dormitory, the Fifth Circuit said, lacked the "winches, running lights,
a radar, a compass, engines, navigational aids, Global Positioning System, lifeboats, or steering equipment such as rudders" 5 that characterize ocean-going vessels. Moreover, "[i]t is
incapable of self-propulsion; has no captain, engineer, or deckhand; has no bilge pumps or
wing tanks; and has never been offshore. ' '7 6 While the harbor-dredge in Stewart did move
and transport equipment, the floating dormitory in Holmes "has never been inspected by
... the Coast Guard [and] ... is not intended to transport personnel, equipment, passengers, or cargo.... ."' First by distinguishing the physical features of the floating dormitory
from those of the harbor-dredge in Stewart, and second by using Stewart's admonition that
federal statutes merely codified the general maritime law's definition of vessel, the Fifth
Circuit was able to fall back on a series of older cases that on casual glance appeared to be
overruled by Stewart.
Whether Holmes will be overturned remains to be seen. To date, the cases that have relied
upon Stewart have involved personal injury, under either the Jones Act or the LHWCA.
Nevertheless, the definition of "vessel" in section 3 of title I applies in other contexts as
well, and the opinion in Stewart may serve as precedent in cases involving salvage or other
maritime liens. It is thus potentially important for domestic and foreign lien-holders alike.
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